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Abstract
Some governments have recently called for international accords restricting
the use of preferential taxes targeted to attract mobile tax bases from
abroad. Are such agreements likely to discourage tax competition or
conversely cause it to spread? We study a general model of competition for
multiple tax bases and establish conditions for a restriction on preferential
regimes to increase or decrease tax revenues. Our results show that
restrictions are most likely to be desirable when tax bases are on average
highly responsive to a coordinated increase in tax rates by all governments,
and when tax bases with large domestic elasticities are also more mobile
internationally. Our analysis allows us to reconcile the apparently
contradictory results, derived from analyzing special cases, of the previous
literature.
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Canada1 Introduction
Governments often appear to target business tax relief to attract investment from abroad,
whilemaintaininghigher taxes onimmobile investment. These preferential tax arrangements
take many forms, including sectoral di¤erences in corporation income tax rates, selective
investment tax credits and tax holidays, income tax measures that are “ring-fenced” (i.e.
unavailable to domestic taxpayers), and so on. For example, Ireland’s low corporate tax
rate for manufacturing and …nancial services is often identi…ed as a primary reason for its
success inattracting foreign direct investment in the past decade. Similarly, recent proposals
in Germany and elsewhere to cut corporate tax rates relative to top personal rates re‡ect
in part the view that much corporate income is mobile internationally, while income of
unincorporated businesses (subject to personal rates) is not.1
These tax measures have emerged in response to increased mobility of some forms of
capital and increased international competition for these bases. Recently, international or-
ganizations have attempted to de…ne international standards for capital taxation as a means
to control tax competition. The OECD (1998, 2000), for example, has developed guidelines
for eliminating “harmful tax competition”among member nations, and is directing its e¤orts
as well at persuading non-member states that o¤er “tax havens” to reform their ways. The
guidelines suggest zero-rating of some bases is to be discouraged; likewise, measures aimed
at ring-fencing domestic tax base from more mobile international tax bases are strongly
deprecated. In the Irish case, pressure from the European Union has led the government
to replace its dual-rate structure (10 per cent for manufacturing and …nancial services, and
24 per cent for other sectors) with a general, lower rate of 12.5 per cent for most forms of
corporate income. A similar philosophy pervades thinking about subnational tax competi-
tion in federal states. In Canada, the federal government has recently attempted to enforce
a common de…nition of taxable income for the provinces, in an e¤ort to end zero-rating of
some income items that are viewed as mobile across provincial boundaries. The goal of this
paper is to evaluate the e¤ects of such restrictions on equilibrium tax rates within a general
theoretical model of competition among governments for several tax bases.
At …rst glance, the move to restrict tax preferences appears perfectly sensible. By linking
tax policies applied to internationally mobile bases to those applied to less mobile ones,
governments would create a “brake” on the tendency to compete tax rates on mobile bases
to ine¢ciently low levels. Tax rates levied on mobile bases would tend to rise, raising
1Under the German reform, the corporate tax rate will fall to 25 from 40 per cent, while the top personal
rate will be 42 per cent.
2equilibrium revenues. On the other hand, tax rates on immobile bases would fall, as the
restriction caused the e¤ects of tax competition to spread through the economy. Whether
such a restriction would lead to higher revenues overall, therefore, depends the nature of
strategic interactions for more and less mobile bases and on the elasticities of the bases. Put
di¤erently, it is possible that restrictions on tax competition would simply lead governments
to compete through other, less e¢cient means. In this paper we explore this trade-o¤ and
provide a comprehensive analysis of factors which lead restrictions either to increase or
decrease revenues.
In so doing, we also seek to reconcile apparently con‡icting conclusions of earlier research.
Janeba and Peters (1999) study an example in which each of two governments may levy a
tax on a domestic base that is immobile internationally and on a base that is perfectly
mobile between the two jurisdictions. They show that a complete ban on tax policies that
di¤erentiate between the two bases (but which does not restrict the tax rates imposed in
either country) raises the equilibrium level of revenue in both countries. On the other hand,
Keen (2000) argues that international restrictions on preferential tax regimes may reduce
revenues in all countries party to the agreement. Keen studies another example, in which
both bases are imperfectly mobile, but the size of each tax base is …xed in the aggregate. In
stark contrast to the results of Janeba and Peters, Keen shows in this environment that a
prohibition on tax preferences can never increase revenues.2
An important contribution of our formal analysis is to derive a general condition that
allows us to assess when restrictions on tax preferences are desirable and when they are not.
Our general condition is appealing because it depends on very few elasticities: the elasticity
of a tax base with respect to a single country’s tax rate, with respect to a coordinated tax
change, and the derivative of the …rst elasticity. The condition provides several important
insights and has interesting policy implications. First, we show that the results of the previ-
ous literature emerge as special cases of our more general model. Secondly, we demonstrate
that the case both for and against the restriction of tax preferences is in some sense more
general than the previous literature suggests.
In particular, using our approach we are able to show that a restriction of tax preferences
can increase revenues even if the di¤erence in international mobility of tax bases is not as
extreme as in Janeba and Peters (1999). Some degree of restriction is always desirable if
2Our analysis is closely related to the literature on third-degree price discrimination in the theory of
industrial organization. Holmes (1989) and Winter (1997) study the e¤ects on pro…ts and consumer welfare
of a restriction on price discrimination in a duopoly. Some of our results (in particular Propositions 2 and
4) have close analogues in their work.
3the tax base with the lower rate in the uncoordinated equilibrium is su¢ciently more mobile
internationally than the base with the higher uncoordinated tax rate (Proposition 2). On
the other hand, we show that any restriction of tax preferences is harmful if the aggregate
tax base does not respond to a coordinated tax change (Proposition 1). This generalizes
the …nding of Keen (2000). The result however appears not to be particularly robust when
aggregate tax bases are elastic. For the central case in which both bases are equally elastic
with respect to coordinated tax rate changes, our results suggest some restriction on tax
preferences is desirable whenever coordinated elasticities are su¢ciently large (Proposition
4). Nevertheless, a complete ban on tax preferences remains undesirable (Proposition 3).
Which of these cases is the most plausible empirically? Certainly, it is reasonable to
expect that aggregate tax bases are elastic. In the theoretical literature on tax competition,
it is often assumed that aggregate capital supply is …xed and hence aggregate tax bases are
perfectly inelastic. But an increase in the overall level of taxation lowers the net return on
savings and so may decrease aggregate saving. As well, restrictions on tax preferences are
typically contemplated among only a small group of countries. Consequently, an increase
in tax rates by parties to the agreement gives investors the option to move their capital
elsewhere, reducing the aggregate tax base of member countries. If this leakage e¤ect is
strong enough, our results suggest that some restriction on tax preferences to be bene…cial.
To say more than this requires estimates of the three elasticities, a point which we will
discuss in the concluding section.
While our approach is more general than previous ones, we maintain a number of impor-
tant assumptions from the existing literature. For example, we assume that countries are
symmetric and governments maximize tax revenues (like in Keen). The symmetry assump-
tion is made for analytical convenience and represents a good starting point. The revenue
maximization assumption, while often used in tax competition models, appears quite restric-
tive. In an appendix, we showthat results under revenue maximization are similar to results
under the more standard welfare maximization objective if there is large underprovision of
public goods. Another important assumption is that we assume no spillover e¤ects between
tax bases. This seems to be a reasonable approximation if we think of tax bases as capital
income in di¤erent sectors or industries, where e¤ective tax rates may di¤er due to di¤erent
depreciationrules or other sector-speci…c tax provisions. Spillovers are likely to play a bigger
role when tax bases represent real and …nancial capital in one sector, or capital and labor
income more generally.
The remainder of the paper has the following structure. Section 2 introduces our model
of tax competition with two tax bases and two jurisdictions, and it describes equilibrium
4tax policies when tax preferences for mobile bases are unrestricted. Section 3 studies the
e¤ects of international restrictions on tax preferences, modelled as a parametric limit on the
di¤erence in tax rates applied to the two bases. We relate the e¤ects of such restrictions to
the elasticities of tax bases with respect to coordinated and unilateral increases in tax rates.
We then provide various conditions that are su¢cient for restrictions on tax preferences to
increase or decrease revenues. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Model
Consider a model of two identical countries, labelled “home” and “foreign”, which compete
for two tax bases. Let xi(ti;Ti) denote tax base i = 1;2 for the home country when home
and foreign country levy tax rates ti and Ti respectively; let Xi(ti;Ti) be the analogous base
for the foreign country. Assume that (ti;Ti) 2 [0;1]2 and tax bases are almost everywhere
twice continuously di¤erentiable in tax rates. For each tax base in the home country xi, we
de…ne two elasticities. The elasticity with respect to a unilateral increase in the tax rate of













(The symbols a and b are intended as mnemonics for “alone” and “both” respectively.) For
notational convenience, the elasticities have been de…ned when both countries set the same
tax rate ti; this will su¢ce for our purposes since we examine symmetric equilibria below.
Note also the convention that elasticities are measured as positive numbers.
We make the following assumptions about tax bases i = 1;2:
A1. xi(ti;Ti) = Xi(Ti;ti) for all (ti;Ti).
A2. ²a
i(t) is an increasing function of t (i.e. ²a
i
0 > 0), and ²a
1(t) > ²a
2(t) for all t > 0.
A3. ²a
i(t) ¸ ²b
i(t) ¸ 0 for all t.
A1 states that tax bases of the home and foreign countries are symmetric. The …rst
part of A2 states that bases become more elastic as tax rates increase. This is a regularity
conditionwhichguarantees governments respondtoa restrictionontax preferences by raising
5the lower tax rate and decreasing the higher one.3 The second part of A2 states that tax
base 1 is unambiguously more elastic with respect to a country’s tax rate than is tax base 2.
A3 states that bases are less elastic with respect to a coordinated change in both countries’












i(t). For example, the case of an internationally immobile tax base is
characterized by ²c
i(t) = 0. When the aggregate amount of a tax base is …xed, ²b
i(t) = 0, we
deal with with the framework assumed by Keen (2000). Note that ²b
i > 0 may capture the
e¤ects of tax-base ‡ight to third-party countries, or a tax that has distortionary e¤ects on
the base in each country.
Governments in the two countries are of the “Leviathan” type, setting tax rates to max-
imize revenues derived from the two bases. This assumption is consistent with maximizing
welfare of domestic residents if all capital is owned by non-residents and investment does
not increase the productivity of other, domestic factors of production. As well, results for
welfare-maximizing governments is more generally similar, as long as the marginal bene…t of
public spending is high relative to the marginal bene…t of private goods. We show this in an
appendix. The Leviathan hypothesis allows us also to compare results to previous research.
In the absence of any coordinating mechanism for the two governments, the home country
sets its tax rate ti on each base to maximize revenue tixi(ti;Ti) given Ti. In a symmetric
Nash equilibrium,4 the tax rates ti = Ti ´ t
p
i satisfy the …rst-order conditions ²a
i(t
p
i) = 1 for




2: both countries o¤er a “tax preference” to tax base 1, which




1 denote the di¤erence
in rates in the tax preference régime.
If the two governments harmonized tax policies and maximized joint revenues, rates
would be set on each base to maxti(xi +Xi), and optimal rates would satisfy the …rst-order
condition ²b
i(tc
i) = 1. Note that tax rates would still be di¤erentiated for the two bases,
although it might be reasonable to expect that the di¤erence in rates is smaller than for the
3It is possible to show this is a minimal su¢cient condition to guarantee stability of the unrestricted
Nash equilibrium when countries’ tax rates are strategic complements. To see this, note that the slope
of the reaction function follows from di¤erentiating the …rst-order condition ²a




i =@ti), and the stability condition in the strategic complements case is dt¤
i=dTi < 1
in a neighbourhood of the equilibrium. This in turn implies ²a
i
0 > 0.
4We analyze existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium below in Lemma 1..




2).5 However, when ²b
1(t) = ²b
2(t) for all t, it follows
that optimal tax rates are uniform for the two bases: tc
1 = tc
2. We discuss this possibility
further below.
3 Restrictions on tax preferences
If governments were able to coordinate tax policies, they could impose the rates (tc
1;tc
2) that
maximize joint revenues. For a variety of reasons, however, such an arrangement may not
be implementable. For political reasons, governments may regard it an unacceptable loss
of sovereignty to cede taxation powers to another government or a supranational agency.
As well, when nations di¤er in their preferred tax policies, other governments may lack
su¢cient information to implement optimal taxes. This idea is formalized in Dhillon et al.
(1999). A similar idea is discussed, although not formally modeled, in Janeba and Peters
(1999) by arguing that tax bases are stochastic at the time of tax coordination and therefore
state-dependent agreements are hard to implement.
Governments may therefore prefer to implement arrangements that limit the extent of
tax preferences o¤ered to mobile tax bases, without restricting the average level of taxation
that may be chosen. This is clearly a second-best instrument for eliminating tax competition
since, as we noted above, jointly optimal tax rates will generally still involve di¤erentiated
rates for the two bases. But if tax preferences serve mainly to attract mobile bases from
abroad, rather than to raise joint revenue, then such restrictions clearly have the potential to
raise total revenues. To consider such restrictions, suppose that the two governments agree
ex ante to restrict themselves to tax schedules such that t2 ¡ t1 · µ for the home country,
and T2 ¡ T1 · µ for the foreign country, for some parameter µ. When this constraint is
binding (i.e. µ · ±), the home country’s problem is then to choose t1 given T1 to maximize
total home revenue6
R(t1;T1;µ) ´ t1x1(t1;T1) +(t1 + µ)x2(t1 + µ;T1 +µ)
Let t¤
1(T1;µ) = argmaxR(t1;T1;µ) be the reaction function of the home country. A Nash
5It follows from A2 that tc
i > t
p
i for i = 1;2 when xiT > 0. Note that the di¤erence in tax rates need not





1 is small, but they di¤er in their aggregate elasticity, i.e. ²b
1 > ²b
2 or vice versa.
6Note the constraint must bind at the optimum. To see this, suppose revenues are maximized when
t2 < t1 + µ and denote the solution ~ t1;~ t0
2. If ~ t1 < t
p
1, then second tax rate ~ t2 < t
p
2 must be less than the rate
in the unrestricted preference equilibrium. However, t2x2 is increasing in t2 for t2 · t
p
2, a contradiction. A
similar argument holds when ~ t1 > t
p
1.
7equilibrium is then a …xed point of the two countries’ reaction functions.
Naturally, it would be reassuring if we could guarantee that a well-behaved solution to
the governments’ problems exists, and that a symmetric …xed point of the reaction functions
exists and perhaps is even unique. It turns out that the…rst desideratum, existence of a Nash
equilibrium for all µ can be guaranteed if the two revenue functions are concave in the home
country’s tax rate. Admittedly, this is astrong restriction, at least for tax basefunctions that
have the property that a country’s base falls to zero before the maximum feasible tax rate is
reached. A related case was studied by Janeba and Peters (1999), where one of the bases is
perfectly mobile, so that a country’s share of the base falls to zero whenever it imposes a tax
rate higher than its competitor. It is shown there that, when tax preferences are abolished,
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium tax rates may not exist.7 In this case, revenue functions
are discontinuous, so that existence problems are not surprising. But similar problems arise
whenever there is a “choke tax rate” above which a country’s base falls to zero, leading to
a non-convexity at the associated kink in the revenue function. The second desideratum,
uniqueness of a symmetric Nash equilibrium, requires a related but stronger restriction on







satisfy the Hadamard property if minfjxittj;jxiTTjg > jxitTj. (This is sometimes also called
the dominant-diagonal property.) This condition, which is clearly related to the stability
of reaction functions, proves to be su¢cient for uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. We note
that, while the restrictions are strong, none of our results below rely explicitly on these
assumptions, as long as a symmetric Nash equilibrium exists.
Lemma 1 Assume A1–A3, and that revenue functions tixi(ti;Ti) are concave in ti. Then,
for all µ, there exists a Nash equilibrium which is symmetric: both countries choose the tax
rate ^ t1(µ) that solves ^ t1 = t¤
1(^ t1;µ). Moreover, assume that the Hessian matrices of the base
functions satisfy the Hadamard property. Then this equilibrium is unique and stable: i.e.
t¤
1T(^ t1;µ) < 1 for all µ.
Proof. See appendix.
Let us denote the equilibrium tax rate for base 2 by ^ t2(µ) = ^ t1(µ) + µ and de…ne the
7The problem is that revenue functions are not concave, and each country may wish to impose a high
tax rate on the immobile base when the other country sets a low rate, but impose a low rate to attract the
mobile when the other country sets a high rate.




^ ti(µ)xi(^ ti(µ);^ ti(µ)):
Our chief interest is indetermining whenthe equilibrium inwhich tax preferences are banned
yields greater revenue than the equilibrium with unrestricted tax preferences, i.e. whether
V np = V (0) ¸ V (±) = V p. However, we will also investigate the the impact on revenues of










The following gives a more useful characterization of V 0. We additionally assume ²b
i < 1
for all µ · ±. That is, tax rates remain below the levels that maximize joint revenue of the
two countries, no matter how binding are constraints on tax preferences. This allows us to
focus on the interesting case in which evaluating a restriction on preferential arrangements
involves a real trade-o¤ between revenue gains from a low-tax base and revenue losses from
a high-tax base. When ²b
i ¸ 1 for one base or the other, in contrast, further restrictions on
tax preferences create an unambiguous gain or loss in total revenues.
Lemma 2 Assume ²b





























The proof consists of showing that, when restrictions on tax preferences are tightened,
revenues from base 1 increase by an amount inversely proportional to Á1, while revenues
from base 2 decrease in inverse proportion to Á2. On balance, the …rst e¤ect is smaller, so





























9The …rst term on each side of the expression represents the base e¤ect of the restrictions on
revenuesfromeachbase. When, intheabsenceofrestrictions, governmentso¤er excessive tax
preferences in order to attract the mobile base from abroad, a restriction on tax preferences
increases revenues through the base e¤ect. To see this, observe that, in viewof A2, ²a
1 ¸ 1 ¸
²a
2 for all µ · ±. Thus the …rst term on the left-hand side of (6) is negative, whereas the …rst
term on the right-hand side is positive. In the absence of the second term on each side of
(6), therefore, we would have Á1 < Á2 for all µ; that is, restrictions on tax preferences tend
to increase equilibrium revenues through the base e¤ect per se. The exception to this is the
case studied by Keen (2000), in which ²b
i = 0, so that the base e¤ect is entirely absent. We
analyze this case further below.
The second term on each side of the inequality is what Winter (1997) has called the
strategic e¤ect of the restriction. The strategic e¤ect captures the impact the restriction has
on the intensity of competition between the two governments and therefore on the level of
taxes for each base. For base i, ²a
i
0 > 0 re‡ects the impact of a coordinated increase in ti on
each government’s marginal incentive to raise its own tax rate for that base. A restriction
on tax preferences increases t1 and decreases t2. As t1 rises, competition for the …rst base
intensi…es, which tends to limit the tax increase. Conversely, the fall in t2 has a dampening
e¤ect on competition for the second base, which works to reduce the tax cut that is o¤ered
in equilibrium. Each of these e¤ects on tax rates is scaled in (6) by 1 ¡ ²b
i, which measures
the impact of a proportional tax increase onrevenues from the relevant base. If the net e¤ect
1=Ái captured by the two terms is smaller for base 1 than for base 2, then total revenues fall
with the restriction.
3.1 The role of base e¤ects
To understand how the base e¤ect in‡uences desirability of restrictions, suppose that the
aggregate amount of each base in the two countries is …xed. This implies, because of the
symmetry assumption, that
xi(t;T) + xi(T;t) = constant
for all (t;T). Then the base in each country is a function of the di¤erence in tax rates
alone, say xi(t;T) = Bi(T ¡ t), where B0
i > 0. This case was analyzed by Keen (2000), who
showed that a complete abolition of tax preferences necessarily reduces revenues. With our
di¤erent approach, it can further be shown that V is increasing in µ: any restriction on tax
preferences reduces revenues. Since xi(t;T) = Bi(T ¡t), ²b











Á1(^ t1) = ²a
1
0(^ t1) > ²a
2
0(^ t2) = Á2(^ t2)
and V 0 > 0, which establishes the following corollary to Lemma 2.
Proposition 1 Suppose that aggregate bases are independent of tax rates (²b
i ´ 0). Then
any degree of restrictions on tax preferences reduces equilibrium revenues.
The case of …xed aggregate bases is evidently a very special one, although it has hitherto
received a great deal of attention in the literature on capital tax competition. But a similar
logic may be applied to show how aggregate base elasticities in‡uence the sign of V 0 more
generally. Di¤erentiating the unilateral elasticity in (1), we can express the marginal revenue












As long as the latter second-order terms are small, therefore, we will have Á1(t1) > Á2(t2),
and a restriction on tax preferences is undesirable, when ²b
2 is small or ²b
1 is large. This is
as expected. When base 2 is relatively unresponsive to a coordinated decrease in tax rates,
the revenue losses of the restriction are large; similarly, when base 1 is highly elastic, the
corresponding revenue gains of the restriction are small. The converse is true when the
relative magnitudes of the elasticities of the elasticities are reversed.
This suggests it is important to assess the impact of a restriction in the central case in
which bothbases are equally responsive to a coordinated rate change, i.e. ²b
1(t) = ²b
2(t). (This
will generalize Proposition 1, in which ²b
1 = ²b
2 = 0.) When this is the case, the e¤ects of a
restriction depend on the more subtle issue of how governments adjust tax rates in response
to the restriction, rather than simply the magnitude of spillover e¤ects. We return to this
case in Propositions 3 and 4 below.
3.2 Small restrictions on tax preferences
One may ask whether, beginning from an initial equilibrium with unlimited tax preferences,





…rst-order conditions are ²a




i. Evaluating (5) with these







2. This condition is stated more usefully in the following proposition.













i.e. if and only if the proportional di¤erence in cross-country spillovers exceeds the propor-
tional di¤erence in strategic e¤ects.




0, so that strategic
e¤ects on the two bases are exactly o¤setting. Then the proposition states that a small
restriction on tax preferences increases revenue when ²c
2 < ²c
1. This is the case that receives
most attention in the policy literature, in which the tax base that has the lower tax rate
in the unrestricted equilibrium (called henceforth the ”low-tax base”) is the more mobile
internationally, so that a small restriction on tax preferences creates positive net spillovers
in revenues for both countries. Conversely, however, it is possible that ²c
2 > ²c
1, so that
V 0 > 0. When this is so, the high-tax base has stronger cross-country spillover e¤ects than
the low-tax base. Consequently, there is in fact too little di¤erentiation in tax rates at the
unregulated equilibrium, and revenues would fall further if the di¤erence in tax rates were
constrained by international agreement. Similarly, when ²c
1 = ²c
2, the spillover e¤ects for the
two revenue sources are exactly o¤setting, and the net impact of the restriction depends




0, competition for the …rst tax
base intensi…es with the restriction more than competition for the second base diminishes,





In the limiting cases where one of the two bases is immobile internationally (²c
i ! 0), the
e¤ects of a restriction can be determined from (8) regardless of the sign or magnitude of the
strategic e¤ect.8 When ²c
2 = 0, the high-tax base is internationally immobile, and (8) shows
that a small restriction must increase revenues. Since there are no international spillovers
in base 2, joint revenues from this base are maximized at the unrestricted equilibrium, and
the reduction in t2 caused by the restriction creates a negligible loss in revenues. The result
is in spirit of Janeba and Peters (1999), who show that, when one base is perfectly mobile
internationally and the other perfectly immobile, a complete abolition of tax preferences
increases revenues. In contrast, our result applies also when the low-tax base is imperfectly
mobile internationally, but only for small restrictions on tax preferences. Conversely, when
²c
1 = 0 the low-tax base is internationally immobile, and a small restriction must decrease
8Formally, the decomposition in (6) is invalid when ²c
i = 0, since it would involve division by zero. But
in these cases we can use (4) to establish the results directly.
12revenues because the …rst-order loss in revenues from base 2 creates a negligible increase in
revenues from base 1. Taken together, these two results suggest that immobility of one tax
base has very strong implications for the e¤ects of tax preferences. The important point is
that it is crucial which of the two bases is immobile.
A result which applies only locally may be deemed to be of little value, since real-world
agreements to restrict tax preferences involves discrete jumps in tax policies. When V is a
quasi-concave function, however, V 0(±) ¸ 0 implies V (µ) · V (±) for all µ · ±, so that any
degree of restriction on tax preferences would reduce revenues. It appears di¢cult to …nd
economically meaningful conditions on tax base functions that guarantee V is quasi-concave.
We showbelowthat V is quasi-concave whentax bases arelinearfunctions of tax rates. Thus
the assumption is not vacuous.
Corollary Suppose that V(µ) is quasi-concave. Then a su¢cient condition for any degree
of restrictions on tax preferences to reduce equilibrium revenues is that (8) holds at the
unregulated equilibrium µ = ±.
3.3 Optimally uniform tax rates
Our preceding results suggest that restrictions on preferential tax arrangements aimed at
limiting tax competition may quite frequently have the perverse e¤ect of reducing revenues.
Loosely speaking, this occurs in a broad set of circumstances because a restriction on tax
preferences causes equilibrium tax rates on less mobile, high-tax bases to fall more than
proportionately to increases in tax rates on more mobile, low-tax bases. It might be felt
that this result re‡ects the “second-best” nature of the reforms we consider: our restrictions
move in the direction of a uniform tax on both bases (i.e. t1 = t2 when µ = 0), although
a uniform tax system does not in general maximize joint revenues of the two countries. In
fact, our results do not depend on the sub-optimality of uniform taxes. To see this, suppose
that ²b
1(t) = ²b
2(t) ´ ²b(t) for all t: in this case, a uniform tax rate for the two bases (that for
which ²b(t) = 1) does indeed maximize joint revenues. In this case, a complete ban on tax
preferences will force governments to adopt a uniform tax system, but at a tax rate that is
belowthe optimal level, as they continue to compete to attract tax bases throughthe limited
means available.
In what follows, we show that introducing a small permissible degree of tax preferences is
likely to increase total revenues, i.e. V 0(0) > 0. Moreover, a small tightening of restrictions
at µ = ± is likely to reduce revenues. For both these results, we assume that the strategic
e¤ects of restrictions are “similar” for the two bases, in the sense that di¤erences in second













¯ is small (9)
when the functions are evaluated at any common tax rate t. Note (9) holds trivially when
tax bases are linear.
Evaluating Ái at µ = 0 for ²b
i = ²b gives







2 and (9) imply V 0(0) > 0 . This establishes the following result.
Proposition 3 Suppose that aggregate base e¤ectsare identical for the two bases, i.e. ²b
1(t) =
²b
2(t) for all t, and that second-order e¤ects are similar for the two bases, i.e. (9) holds.
Then a small increase in permissible tax preferences, beginning from the point of uniformity,
increases equilibrium revenues; i.e. V 0(0) > 0.
Since e¤ects of coordinated tax changes on revenues are identical for the two bases when
²b
1 = ²b
2, a small restriction reduces total revenues if and only if it causes t2 to fall more in
percentage terms than t1 increases. As long as di¤erences in the curvature of the two revenue
functions (and so in strategic e¤ects) is negligible, the proposition implies this will be the
case beginning from an initial point of uniform taxation.
It might be useful to compare our results from this section with those of Keen (2000)
and Proposition 1. When ²b
1 = ²b
2 ´ 0, the base e¤ect of restricting tax preferences is zero.
Revenues monotonically increase in µ because the dampening of competition for tax base 2
outweighs the intensi…ed competition for the …rst tax base. When the aggregate elasticities
are the same for both tax bases, but non-zero, the base and the strategic e¤ect work in
opposite direction and that makes it di¢cult to prove a general result.
3.4 Linear tax bases
The preceding result applies when second-order e¤ects in tax base functions are similar for
the two bases. Evidently, this property must obtain when tax bases are linear function of
rates, so that second-order e¤ects are identically zero for both bases. The linear case proves
to be instructive: as we will show, it implies that the “strategic e¤ects” of restrictions,
discussed above, are proportional to initial elasticities. Examination of this case, as well as
14being more straightforward computationally, will allow us to elucidate the role of aggregate
base elasticities in determining whether restrictions are desirable.
Accordingly, we restrict attention to tax bases that are linear, i.e.
xi(t;T) = 1 +(ai ¡ bi)T ¡ ait (10)
for ai > bi > 0, i = 1;2. Assume further that bi < 1 to ensure that tax bases are positive
for all feasible tax rates. Since the second derivatives of tax base functions are zero, the
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2 to hold, we assume a1 + b1 > a2 + b2.9 For any binding restriction µ on tax




























A su¢cient condition for small restrictions to reduce revenues is therefore that the cross-
country spillover ai¡bi is smaller for base 1 than for base 2. The tightening of the restriction
leads to an increase in the …rst tax rate and a decrease in the second tax rate. The gain
from tax base 1 is smaller than the loss from tax base 2. Intuitively, when the spillover
e¤ect is very small for base 1, an increase in tax rate 1 at the unrestricted equilibrium has
a small impact on revenues, while a decrease in tax rate 2 reduces revenues from that tax
base more. The condition a1¡b1 < a2¡b2 is not necessary, however, since a1+b1 > a2+b2.
Thus, even when cross-country spillovers are stronger for base 2 than base 1 (in contrast to
9In fact, this restriction is weaker than the requirement in Assumption A2 that ²a
1 > ²a
2 for all t > 0, but
it is su¢cient in the linear case to guarantee ^ t1 · ^ t2 for all µ · ±, as required. Additional assumptions on
the parameters would however be enough to ensure that A2 holds. For instance, ²a
1(t) > ²a
2(t) for all t > 0
when a1 = a2 > b1 > b2.
15our discussion following Proposition 2), the strategic e¤ect of the restriction may be strong
enough to cause aggregate revenues to fall, despite the positive base e¤ect.
Indeed, the condition is su¢cient for any restriction to reduce revenues, since V is quasi-
concave in the linear case. To establish this, we need only show that V 0 = 0 implies V 00 · 0.










i=(ai+bi) > 0 and ^ t0
1 < 0 < ^ t0
2, it
follows that V 00 · 0; hence V is quasi-concave in the linear case. Together with Corollary 3.2,
this establishes the following.
Proposition 4 Suppose that tax bases are linear functions of tax rates, i.e. (10) holds. Then







Further insight into the condition can be gained by examining the case in which the two
bases respond the same way to coordinated increases in the tax rates, i.e. b1 = b2 = b. In
this case, base 1 is more elastic with respect to a unilateral change in a country’s own tax
rate simply because it is more mobile internationally. When b1 = b2 = b, (12) holds if and
only if
a1a2 ¡ (a1 + a2)b ¡ b2 > 0 (13)
When b is small then the base e¤ect is small, and the strategic e¤ect of a restriction on
preferences leads to a lower average tax rate. (When b = 0, moreover, the result is a special
case of Proposition 1.) When b is large, in contrast, the positive base e¤ect of the restriction
on revenues dominates, so that restrictions on tax preferences are desirable. (In the limiting
case of b = a2, tax base 2 is internationally immobile, and a small restriction again must
increase revenues.)
Our analysis of (12) can be extended by analyzing the roles of a1 and a2. Note that in
general a change in a1 or a2 alone has an ambiguous e¤ect. Interestingly, however, for the




unrestricted equilibrium. This implies also that A2 holds because ²a
1 = at=(1 ¡ b1t) > ²a
2 =
at=(1 ¡ b2t). It is easy to see that (12) holds. The intuition follows the one given above:
Restricting preferences leads to a gain in revenues from tax base 1 that is smaller than the
loss from base 2 because the former is more elastic than the latter.
164 Conclusion
Policy makers in some governments and international organizations have recently expressed
concern about the increasing use of tax preferences to attract internationally mobile tax
bases: Allowing tax preferences leads to intense competition for mobile tax bases and hence
to an erosion of government revenues. The purpose of this paper was to shed light on this
claim. This is important because an appealing counter-argument can be made: Restricting
tax preferences is harmful because competition for one tax base may spill over to other tax
bases and therefore revenues fall. In e¤ect, a restriction on the form of tax competition may
simply induce governments to compete in another, less e¢cient way, leading to lower total
revenues for all. The two con‡icting views have found support in the previous literature.
An important contribution of our formal analysis was to derive a general condition that
allows us to assess when restrictions on tax preferences are desirable or not. Thereby we
are able to show how, in analyzing special cases, the previous literature has arrived at
opposing conclusions. Our analysis allowed us to decompose the impact of a restriction into
its “base e¤ect” and “strategic e¤ect”. Arriving at de…nitive welfare prescriptions is di¢cult
in general, since the two e¤ects tend to work in opposite directions. Our general condition is
appealing nevertheless since it depends on very few, empirically observable elasticities: the
elasticity of a tax base with respect to a single country’s tax rate, the elasticity of a tax base
with respect to a coordinated tax change, and the derivative of the …rst elasticity.
The general condition leads to a number of more practical insights. First, when bases
do not respond to a coordinated change in tax rates, then the base e¤ect is absent, and
any restriction on tax preferences will reduce revenues. This generalizes a result of Keen
(2000). More realistically, however, tax bases grow when all governments cut tax rates,
and further investigation suggests this result is not particularly robust. Restrictions on tax
preferences tend to be revenue increasing when the tax base that has the higher tax rate in
the uncoordinated equilibrium (i.e. the high-tax base) is less internationally mobile, and the
more mobile is the low-tax base. Moreover, even if the elasticities with respect to coordinated
tax changes are the same for both bases, but not zero as in Keen, (small) restrictions tend to
be revenue increasing if both tax bases are highly responsive. In these cases, a restriction on
tax preferences leads to small revenue losses from the high-tax base and more than o¤setting
revenue gains from increasing the tax on the low-tax base.
On the other hand, we identi…ed several cases under which revenues may fall when re-
strictions are tightened. In particular, we show this for the case when the joint revenue
maximizing tax rates are the same for both bases. If tax preferences are initially prohibited
17entirely, then a loosening of the restriction increases revenues. We showed also that results
under welfare maximization are qualitatively similar to those derived here if there is large
underprovision of public goods.
Our research could be extended in a variety of ways in the future. On the empirical side,
it would be useful to get estimates for the various elasticities that we identi…ed in our formal
analysis. We expect that the elasticities are quite di¤erent across sectors or industries. There
is likely to be a large di¤erence in terms of international mobility between real capital and
…nancial capital. The OECD has been concerned largely about the latter. Yet Ireland’s case
suggests that policymakers are also concerned about tax preferences for real investment.
Applying our results to evaluate actual agreements to restrict tax preferences requires
robust estimates of tax base elasticities and e¤ective tax rates, and naturally conclusions are
apt to bespeci…c tothe casebeing studied. At the broadest level, however, ourresultssuggest
agreements to restrict competition for corporate tax bases may be desirable. In most OECD
countries, statutory corporate tax rates have declinedsubstantially in the last decade relative
to top personal income tax rates. As well, average e¤ective tax rates on capital income
are now less than those on labour income, the result of a substantial change in relative
burdens since the late 1980s Sorensen (2000). It is common to argue for parity between
corporate and top personal rates in domestic policy debates in order to reduce the possibility
of tax avoidance through the incorporation decision. Our analysis however suggests another,
international argument for parity: international agreements linking corporate tax rates to
top personal tax rates are likely to limit corporate tax competition and increase revenues
overall. The case for such restrictions will be enhanced in the future if the downward trend
in e¤ective corporate tax rates continues. We note here again that this conclusion rests on
the assumption that there are no signi…cant spillover e¤ects between tax bases.
We made several important assumptions in our theoretical model whose relaxation would
be desirable. For example, we assumed that countries are symmetric. While this assump-
tion makes our analysis much more tractable, many countries that engage heavily in tax
preferences are small (e.g. Luxembourg, Ireland, Bahamas, etc.). It is therefore desirable
to learn more about the e¤ects of tax preferences when countries are asymmetric. Another
useful extension would allow for heterogeneity of citizens. Individuals may di¤er in terms
of the level of incomes and the sources of income. Some individuals may receive a dispro-
portionate share of their income from internationally mobile tax bases and hence favor tax
preferences. Allowing for heterogeneity would also require the modeling of how governments
make decisions in the presence of political con‡ict.
18Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Since the revenue functions are concave in ti, R(t;T;µ) is concave in t.
It follows that t¤
1(T1;µ) is single-valued and, in view of A2, continuous in T1. Thus a …xed
point of t¤
1, ^ t1 = t¤
1(^ t1;µ), exists.
Next we show t¤
1T(t1;µ) < 1 when t¤
1 = t1 and the Hessian matrices have the Hadamard
property. Di¤erentiating the …rst-order condition Rt = 0 gives
t
¤




Rtt + RtT =
X
i














Sincethebasefunctions areconcave, xitt < 0, andthe Hadamardproperty implies xitt+xitT <
0. Thus t¤
1T ¡ 1 < 0. It follows that t¤
1 has a unique …xed point.
Lastly, supposethere exists anasymmetric equilibrium, inwhich the two countries choose
distinct tax rates (~ t1; ~ T1). The …rst-order condition for the home country is
Rt(~ t1; ~ T1;µ) = 0
and, using the symmetry assumption A1, the …rst-order condition for the foreign country is
Rt(~ T1;~ t1;µ) = 0
where Rt is the derivative of the function with respect to the …rst argument. Since R is
quasi-concave, this is a contradiction. Hence (^ t1;^ t1) is the unique equilibrium.










Rtt + RtT ¡ Rtµ
Rtt + RtT
19Since
Rtµ = 2x2t + x2T +t2(x2tt + x2tT)
Rtt + RtT =
X
i=1;2










2x1t + x1T +t1(x1tt + x1tT)
Rtt +RtT
> 0
where the signs ofthe derivatives are guaranteedby the Hadamard property and Assumption












































by A2. Collecting terms then gives the expressions stated in the lemma. Finally, recall from
the proof of Lemma 1 that stability (i.e. t¤
1T(^ t1;µ) < 1) implies Rtt +RtT < 0, which in turn
implies ® > 0.
A Comparison of revenue and welfare maximization
Consider the basic model with the same notation. To analyze the case of welfare max-
imization, we introduce a representative household in each country. The household in
home has preferences over the two decisions y1;y2 and a public good g: Let utility be
u(y1;y2;g): This is maximized subject to a budget constraint that can be written in the
form f(y1;y2;t1;t2;T1;T2) = 0: As in the base model, we assume no links between tax bases,
so that the solution to the utility maximization problem can be written as y1 = y1(t1;T1)
and y2 = y2(t2;T2): The decision problem in foreign is similar with utility U(Y1;Y2;G).
There are two tax bases, which we denote xi for home and Xi for foreign. We assume
10Note that if the Hadamard property did not hold here, then both tax rates would either increase or
decrease together, and e¤ect on total revenue would be unambiguous (see (4)). In this sense, the assumptions
here allow us to focus on the interesting case.
20that the private decisions give rise to these tax bases such that
yi + Yi = xi +Xi i = 1;2:
For example, the left hand side of this equation could stand for the sum of home and foreign
savings, while the right hand side represents the capital employed in each country. Home’s
tax base depends on the tax rates in both countries. Let xi = xi(ti ¡ Ti;zi(ti;Ti)); where
ti ¡ Ti determines the split between countries of a total tax base of zi = yi + Yi such that
with symmetric countries xi(0;zi) = zi=2 = yi: For notational convenience we write the tax
base xi more compactly as xi = xi(ti;Ti) and similar for foreign. Government revenue is
g = h(x1(t1;T1);x2(t2;T2);t1;t2); (15)
where the function h captures the possibility that tax rates are ad valorem (so that the
function is not linear in xi).
Revenue maximization. Under revenue maximization the government maximizes (15)
subject to the constraint t2 = t1 + µ. In a Nash equilibrium tax rates are functions of
µ; so that t1(µ);t2(µ);T1(µ); and T2(µ): Government revenue can now be written VR(µ) =
h(x1(t1(µ);T1(µ));x2(t2(µ);T2(µ));t1(µ);t2(µ)); where the subscript indicates revenue maxi-
mization. We are interested in the shape of this function in order to compare it with the
one under welfare maximization. Di¤erentiating with respect to µ and using the …rst-order


















where we used the partial derivative @t2=@µ = 1.
Welfare Maximization. In this case the government maximizes utility of the represen-
tative individual subject to the behavioural responses and the constraint (15). Again, the
Nash equilibrium can be de…ned as a function of µ and we can write welfare as VW(µ).



































































21where the second equality follows from the fact that in a symmetric equilibrium xi = yi.
It is now clear that (16) and (17) are proportional if ui=ug becomes very small, that is,
there is large underprovision of public goods.
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